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Abstract 
 
Several laboratory techniques have been developed over the last few decades that reliably 
produce memory distortions. However, it is unclear whether false memory production in one 
experimental paradigm will predict susceptibility to false memories in other paradigms. In 
Experiment 1, 202 undergraduates participated in a misinformation experiment and semi- 
autobiographical tasks involving three measures of memory distortion (suggestion, imagination, 
emotion). We established high internal consistency in individual differences measures and 
statistically significant experimental effects where we would expect them (e.g. the 
misinformation effect). However, false memory production in one task did not predict false 
memories in other paradigms. In Experiment 2, 163 adults participated in a misinformation 
experiment, a false memory word list task (Deese-Roediger/McDermott; DRM), and semi- 
autobiographical false news story tasks. Again we found no consistent predictive relationships 
among various false memories. In both studies, no individual differences predicted memory 
distortion susceptibility consistently across tasks and across experiments. At this time, false 
memory production in a given laboratory task does not appear to adequately predict false 
memories in other tasks, a finding with implications for using these tasks to predict memory 
distortion in real world situations. 
Keywords: memory distortion, false memory, DRM, misinformation, crashing memory, 
autobiographical 
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Memory Distortion Tasks Do Not Reliably Predict Other Memory Distortions 
Memory distortion has been widely studied and observed in a variety of populations. In 
this article, we investigate whether some people are especially vulnerable to memory distortion 
across different experimental paradigms. Our research is relevant to the question of whether false 
memories elicited in a laboratory context warrant conclusions regarding false memory 
propensity in general, clinical, or forensic contexts. Whether there is a general false memory 
proneness could then be considered when assessing the veracity of a reported memory, 
particularly when the memory has possibly been contaminated by suggestion. Few studies have 
thoroughly and directly addressed whether false memories predict subsequent false memories 
both within and across experimental paradigms (we use the term “paradigm” to refer to an 
established methodology for creating memory distortions in the laboratory). In this study, we 
examine this question by testing participants using several memory distortion paradigms, while 
also measuring individual differences, to determine if we can identify a subset of participants 
who are generally prone to memory distortion across disparate paradigms. 
Researchers have developed a number of memory distortion paradigms over the past 
several decades that use different methods to elicit memory errors. For example, the 
misinformation paradigm presents misleading post-event information as a means to distort 
memory after a participant has been exposed to an event (e.g., video or photographs; see 
Loftus, 2005). Researchers have shown that misinformation not only changes details for scenes 
(e.g. Loftus, Miller, and Burns, 1978). The mechanisms that explain the misinformation effect 
involve the initial encoding of visual detail into long term memory, the subsequent decay of 
some details over time, the retroactive interference of misleading post-event information, and 
finally source monitoring errors at the time of recall (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; but 
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see Reyna and Brainerd, 1995 for an alternative “fuzzy-trace” explanation). Source monitoring 
errors in the misinformation effect involve mistaking the source of the misinformation as 
originating in the original event. In effect, information about the source of a memory or a piece 
of knowledge is vulnerable to error. 
In another memory distortion paradigm, called the DRM task (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), researchers present participants with a list of words (e.g., bed, dream, 
awaken) that are all semantically related to an unpresented word called a “critical lure” (e.g., 
sleep). Participants very often misremember seeing the critical lure that they had not actually 
seen. The mechanisms behind the DRM effect are plausibly explained by the semantic activation 
of words that in turn spread to activate related concepts, rendering thematically related words 
more accessible to participants during test (semantic network theory: Collins & Quillian, 1969; 
spreading activation theory: Collins & Loftus, 1975). Importantly, these proposed mechanisms 
differ from those for the misinformation effect, although source monitoring has also been used to 
explain aspects of the DRM effect (activation/monitoring theory: Roediger & McDermott, 
2000). 
In the "crashing memory" paradigm, following suggestion, people sometimes report false 
memories of having viewed footage of a widely reported news-related event, when in fact no 
such footage exists (see Crombag, Wagenaar, & van Koppen, 1996). There has been some 
discussion as to whether crashing memory studies reflect false beliefs or false memories, with 
one study finding that the majority of false reports were beliefs without detailed images (Ost et 
al., 2008). Another crashing memory investigation found that the debriefing process reduced the 
percentage of false reports from 81% to 10%, again raising doubts about the percentage of 
genuine false memories, rather than just the expression of beliefs (Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, 
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& Merckelbach, 2009).  Patihis and Loftus (2016) also found a reduction of false memory 
reports in the crashing memory paradigm when initial reports in a questionnaire were followed 
up with a more in-depth structured interview (from 33% to 13%). In terms of mechanisms, these 
latter genuine persistent false memories that “survive” the interview can be understood as source 
monitoring errors. False memories in this paradigm are attributable to source errors—either due 
to misinformation given in the suggestive questions, or source confusion around mental images 
of related events. Although the mechanisms may be similar to the misinformation effect, 
different mechanisms may be involved due to the different types of memory tasks or paradigms 
involved (slideshows of non-autobiographical events vs. important news events). 
Yet another memory distortion paradigm involves a phenomenon known as “imagination 
inflation,” in which the process of imagining a counterfactual event produces increased 
confidence that the imagined event actually was experienced (e.g. Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996). Source monitoring errors can also explain this phenomenon: mental imagery 
created in the context of a study can be mistakenly attributed to actual experience. In other 
words, a mentally manufactured image is confused for an image that has real perceptual origins. 
In another paradigm, research has also suggested that memory for the emotions felt by a 
person in the past is reconstructive, malleable, and biased in the direction of currently held 
cognitive appraisals (e.g. Levine, 1997; Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice, & Laulhere, 2001). In 
other words, memories for previously felt emotions can be distorted. The likely mechanisms 
associated with this phenomenon are described in the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions 
(e.g., Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). According to this theory, we use current appraisals of 
the situation to reconstruct the memory of the emotion. To a lesser extent, the source monitoring 
framework may also explain some aspects of changes in memory of emotion. For example, 
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emotions that were experienced in one situation may be incorrectly attributed to having been 
experienced in a different context. 
We posit that that source monitoring theory plays a major explanatory role in the 
misinformation effect, crashing memories, and imagination inflation, but is less central in DRM 
word lists and memory of emotion. If some people are more susceptible to source monitoring 
errors, it follows that we might find inter-correlations among some of these paradigms. Further, 
we would expect that those paradigms primarily involving source monitoring errors (e.g. 
misinformation) would be more strongly associated with one another than with those primarily 
involving other mechanisms (e.g. DRM).  
Not only are there similarities in mechanisms between paradigms, but differences too. 
For example there are differences between laboratory stimuli and autobiographical stimuli (see 
Roediger & McDermott, 2013; Patihis et al., 2013), and between false beliefs and false 
memories (see Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). These differing approaches and methods of 
creating memory distortions provide the opportunity to use different methods to investigate 
whether a general susceptibility to memory distortion comes into play across diverse situations. 
Differences in mechanisms provide possible reasons why we might find low correlations 
between memory distortions in different paradigms. However, a different explanation might be 
that the assumption that some people are consistently more prone to source monitoring errors 
than other people is wrong. In other words there may not be a strong personality-like trait of 
false memory proneness, at least in non-clinical populations. 
What evidence indicates that performance on false memory tasks predict performance 
on others? Next, we examine whether there is evidence from past studies that false memories 
predict other false memories. We first examine research that provides tangential evidence for 
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memory distortions in one situation predicting distortions in other contexts, and we then consider 
studies that test subjects using more than one technique/paradigm to produce false memories. 
Early Clues from Related Research 
 
Clancy, Schacter, McNally, and Pitman (2000) found that women who reported 
recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse were more prone to false recognition on the 
DRM test, compared with those who did not report recovered memories. These women 
reported not remembering such abuse before therapy or before the return, in adulthood, of 
what they believed to be repressed memories. If these recovered memories were, in fact, 
memory distortions, then this finding might suggest a cross-paradigm false memory 
susceptibility. Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty as to whether the women were 
reporting memory distortions in their recovered recollections, and it is also possible that these 
women might differ from the other participants on any number of unmeasured variables. 
Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, and Pitman (2002) found that participants who 
reported (presumably false) memories of alien abduction recalled more false memories on a 
DRM test. Unlike Clancy et al.’s (2000) work on recovered memories of sexual abuse, we can be 
fairly certain that alien abduction memories do not reflect real events. Clancy et al. (2002) 
compared 11 participants who reported an alien abduction memory with the 13 control 
participants with no false memory or belief regarding alien abduction on their DRM false 
memories (critical lure endorsement rates). Comparing the alien abduction group to the control 
group yielded an effect size of r2 = .31 (p = .005) for recall and r2 = .39 (p = .001) for 
recognition of the critical lures (Clancy et al., 2002; comparisons made using Table 3, p. 458 
column “average”). However, from these results we cannot be sure that false memories of the 
alien abduction do actually correlate with DRM false memories, because those who believed in, 
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but did not remember alien abduction, also demonstrated higher DRM false memory rates. 
 
There were no significant differences on DRM false memories between those who did report a 
false memory of abduction, and those who believed they were abducted but had no false memory 
(DRM critical lure recall r2 < .01, p > .99; recognition r2 = .07, p = .26). Because a belief in 
alien abduction appears to be the factor associated with higher DRM false memories—rather 
than alien abduction memories—further research is warranted. 
Researchers have also studied people who remember past lives using false memory tasks. 
For example, Meyersburg, Bogdan, Gallo, and McNally (2009) found that participants reporting 
memories of past lives also reported more false memories of non-presented critical lure words in 
the DRM task (effect sizes comparing those reporting past live memories to those reporting no 
such memories: DRM recall r = .31; DRM recognition r = .28). However, Peters, Horselenberg, 
Jelicic, and Merckelbach (2007) did not find a significant difference on performance of a false 
fame task between individuals with and without memories of a past life. In the false fame 
illusion, participants read out a list of non-famous and famous people, and at a later time are 
asked to identify which names are famous. Non-famous names that the participant had read in 
the first stage of the study are especially incorrectly remembered as famous at the final stage. 
These studies reviewed used one laboratory paradigm and compared memory rates with 
possible self-reported autobiographical memory errors in the participants’ life. Next, we discuss 
the studies that assessed more than one memory distortion task in a laboratory setting. 
Within Subjects Designs Using More than One False Memory Technique 
 
Relatively few published studies have tested participants using more than one memory 
distortion technique, and then compared the inter-relations among them. Wilkinson and Hyman 
(1998) found that false memories in the DRM task did not correlate with imagination-induced 
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autobiographical memory distortions. The researchers tested 121 undergraduates using an 
exercise in which participants imagined a childhood event that they knew happened, but that 
they did not initially remember. Participants also completed a DRM word list task. The 
association between the imagination-produced memories and the DRM critical lure endorsement 
was not significant, with respect to DRM tests using both recall r = –.165, p > .05 and 
recognition, r = –.175, p > .05. The authors stated that the findings supported the idea that 
“autobiographical memory errors and semantic intrusions are different” (p. S41). Similarly, Qin, 
Ogle, and Goodman (2008) found no significant relationship between DRM false memories of 
critical lures and suggestion-induced false memories of events before the age of five (e.g. getting 
lost, birthday party at McDonald’s, an enema; events confirmed by parents not to have 
happened). 
In contrast to these null findings in adults, two studies using children as participants 
found mixed results. Otgaar and Candel (2011) reported that children’s DRM critical lure 
endorsement was not related to suggestion-induced false memories for entire events, regardless 
of whether the DRM word lists were tested using recall (r2 = .02; p =.38) or recognition (r2 = 
.0004; p = .90). In contrast, Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer, and van Oorsouw (2012) found that 
memory distortions in word list recall (DRM) predicted rich false memories in children (Mage = 
8.7). Compared to children who resisted the suggestion, those who came to falsely remember a 
hot air balloon ride evidenced higher endorsement of critical lures. Nevertheless, the study had a 
small sample (N = 45), and the correlations were not significant before certain participants were 
excluded from the analysis (i.e. those with partial false memories). 
With a larger sample of 432 young adult participants, Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, and Dong 
(2013) found a small but statistically significant relationship between critical lure endorsement in 
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a DRM task and false memories on a misinformation task (r = .12, p = .02). For the 
misinformation task, the researchers utilized photographical slideshows (from Okado & Stark, 
2005) and ten DRM word lists. They explain the low correlation by noting that there are 
different mechanisms involved in DRM (semantic memory distortion with potentially little social 
influence at work) and misinformation (episodic memory distortion with potential social 
influence factors). 
Whereas Zhu et al. (2013) found a small relationship between the same two paradigms, 
Ost et al. (2013) found no significant relationship between the paradigms. Rather than using 
slideshows in the misinformation task, Ost et al. (2013) used video (CCTV footage) and utilized 
5 DRM word lists with a recognition test with 120 undergraduate participants. The association 
between DRM false memory (critical lure endorsement) and misinformation recall was r = -.03, 
and between DRM and misinformation recognition was r = -.02, neither of which was 
statistically significant. Monds, Paterson, and Kemp (2016) also found similar results, reporting 
that susceptibility to a DRM and misinformation task were not related. 
As described above, some past studies have found tentative signs that DRM false 
memories predict real-life autobiographical memory distortion (Clancy et al, 2002; Otgaar et al., 
2012), whereas other studies have found either small relationships between DRM false memories 
and misinformation tasks (Zhu et al., 2013), or a negligible relationship (Ost et al., 2013). These 
mixed findings render it difficult to definitively answer whether false memories in one context 
predict false memories in another. Here, we conduct an investigation to address the lack of clear- 
cut findings in previous investigations, using adequate power and replication to examine various 
widely-used memory distortion techniques using a within-subjects design. 
The Present Experiments 
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In two experiments, we investigated whether false memories in one memory distortion 
paradigm predicts susceptibility to false memories in other paradigms. We also examined 
whether any single individual difference measure or attribute of participants is related to memory 
distortion rates across all paradigms. In particular, we chose well validated individual differences 
measures, with established psychometric properties, that have previously been associated with 
memory distortions in research—such as fantasy proneness (Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van 
Heerden, & Merckelbach, 2005) dissociative experiences (Porter, Birt, Yuille, & Lehman, 2000), 
mindfulness (Wilson, Mickes, Stolarz-Fantino, Evrard, & Fantino, 2015), and absorption 
(Meyersburg, Bogdan, Gallo, & McNally, (2009). We also added a number of exploratory 
individual difference measures such as critical-thinking, flexible thinking, empathy, and 
handedness. If false memory proneness is a stable and general propensity across paradigms, we 
would expect to find two outcomes: whether (1) Memory distortion in one paradigm would 
predict higher rates of (or susceptibility to) memory distortion in another paradigm, and (2) 
individual differences patterns would be similar across paradigms. 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Undergraduates (N = 202) participated for course credit. The mean age 
was 20.2 (SD = 3.47; range 18 to 51); 75.2% of participants were female. Ethnicity was 
distributed as 51.4% Asian or Indian, 20.3% Caucasian, 15.8% Hispanic or Latino, 7.4 % Middle 
Eastern, 4.0% Pacific Islander, and 1.0% African American. 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants completed a misinformation experiment, as well as semi-autobiographical 
memory distortion measures (suggestion, imagination, memory of emotion; described below)— 
connected to their memory of the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York City (hereafter 
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referred to as 9/11). Sample size was chosen to be large enough to find small effects (G*Power 
calculation: ρ = .2, α = .05, power = .8, yields N =193 & critical value of r = .14; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) in order to detect any small-to-moderate effects that may exist in the 
larger population. The data-stopping rule involved continuing until the full sample size was 
obtained for our main analysis. 
Participants came into the laboratory setting two times one week apart. Participants first 
read the cover story that the study was about personality, individuality, and slideshows. 
Participants entered the laboratory one at a time, staggered one every 15-20 minutes, and were 
greeted by a research assistant who gave them verbal instructions to prepare them for the study. 
Between one and three participants participated in a laboratory room at any given time, with one 
or two research assistants supervising. Participants were unaware of the actual research questions 
until the debriefing after Session 2. It was apparent to participants that Session 1 and Session 2 
were part of the same study. Participants were individually introduced to the study by a research 
assistant and then completed the study on an individual basis on laboratory computers. Research 
assistants were not in view of the participants during the computer tasks. Aside from materials 
that were manipulated across groups, the general order of the presentation of materials and 
individual differences tasks was the same for all participants. 
Session 1. After being randomly assigned to condition, participants proceeded to 
complete the computer questionnaires. These included measures of fantasy proneness (the 
Creative Experiences Scale; Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001), dissociative 
experiences (DES-C; Wright & Loftus, 1999), mindfulness (Mindful Attention Awareness Scale: 
MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), and absorption (Tellegen Absorption Scale: TAS; Tellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974). As well as these individual differences and personality scales, the participants 
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were asked to report how they felt in the week following the 9/11 attacks. The average age of the 
participants at the time of 9/11 was approximately 10 years old. Specifically, they were asked 
“In the week following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, how often did you feel the 
following emotions?” They then rated 14 negative emotions (Upset, Distressed, Scared, Sad, 
Confused, Grief, Angry, Anxious, Stressed, Helpless, Traumatized, Frustrated, Tense, and 
Jumpy) on a scale from 1 (never) to 10 (all the time). These pretest questions were asked again 
in Session 2 immediately after the United 93 news footage (i.e., “crashing memory”) computer 
questionnaire (posttest). 
Session 2 took about one hour, and included the misinformation effect, the computer 
questionnaire about United 93 footage and memory of emotion after 9/11, and individual 
difference measures served as fillers between these memory-related tasks. At the end of Session 
2, subjects participated in a face-to-face structured interview with a research assistant. 
Session 2. Exactly one week after Session 1, the subject returned to the lab for Session 
2.As in Session 1, a research assistant gave verbal instructions and then helped the participant 
begin the computer questionnaire. 
Misinformation effect experiment phase 1: photographic slideshows. First, subjects saw two 
photographic slideshows as the first part of the misinformation-effect experiment 
(misinformation materials modified from Okado & Stark, 2005). Each slideshow consisted of 50 
photographs, with each picture onscreen for 3500ms. Each photograph was displayed as an 800 x 
600 pixel image on a LCD computer screen. Before the slideshow subjects were asked to watch 
carefully and told they would be asked questions about it later. The first slideshow depicted a 
story of a woman who had her wallet stolen by a man who she thought was helping her. The 
second slideshow portrays a man breaking into a car and searching through various items in the 
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car. 
 
United 93 questionnaire. Participants completed a news story questionnaire asking about 
their memory for United 93 (associated with the 9/11 attack) crash footage. Importantly, the 
questionnaire falsely suggested that footage of the crash exists and has been widely shown (in 
fact, no such footage exists). Participants then reported whether they had seen the footage, and 
whether they remember any specific details. 
Questionnaire posttest questions. Immediately following the United 93 computer 
questionnaire, participants completed a series of posttest measures regarding memory for their 
emotions after September 11, 2001 (worded identically worded to the pretest measures in 
Session 1). Participants then completed some individual differences measures that included 
measures of critical-thinking (modified from West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2009), flexible 
thinking (FTS; Stanovich & West, 1997), empathy (Basic Empathy Scale: BES; Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2006) and a handedness scale (Oldfield, 1971). All the individual difference 
measures served two important purposes: as valid variables of interest, but also as filler material 
between the misinformation- effect phases that also helped to disguise the true nature of the 
study. 
Misinformation-effect experiment phase 2: misinformation narratives. The participants then saw 
a text narrative about the photographic slideshows shown earlier. This occurred approximately 
40 minutes after they originally viewed the photographs. The participants were asked to stay 
focused on reading and to pay attention to the story until it was over. The narratives consisted of 
two sets of 50 sentences, with each sentence displayed on screen for 5500ms in a large font. Of 
the 100 sentences that a given participant saw, all were accurate except for 6 sentences 
containing misinformation. Group A participants received a different set of six misinformation 
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items than Group B did (three items per slideshow). For example, Group A would receive 
misinformation about the thief putting the wallet in his pants pocket, whereas Group B would 
receive no false information about that particular slide. Similarly, Group B received 
misinformation that a cell phone was blue, whereas Group A would receive a sentence that did 
not contain misinformation about the color of the phone. Control group items contained no 
information about the critical detail (so in the examples above no suggestion was made as to the 
actual pocket used, or the actual color of the cell phone). In this way, Group B served as the 
control groups on Group A's misinformation items, and vice versa (similar to methodology in 
Patihis et al., 2013). 
Filler Task. Following this misinformation phase, a 91-item Swedish Scale of Personality 
(SSP) was administered (Gustavsson et al., 2000), which allowed for a gap of approximately 20 
minutes between the misinformation phase and the test phase of the misinformation task. 
Misinformation effect experiment phase 3: test and source test. 
 
Test. Participants answered a series of 18 questions asking what they "remember seeing 
in the original slideshows of photographs." The test phase occurred about 20 minutes after the 
misinformation (phase 2), and about 60 minutes after the original photographic slideshow 
presentations (phase 1). These questions were multiple choice with three possible answers. For a 
given participant, 6 of these 18 questions related to items they had received misinformation 
about in the earlier text narrative. For these items, one of the options was correct (consistent with 
photographs in original slideshow), one option was consistent with the earlier misinformation, 
and the other option was a foil (a wrong answer that was not suggested). We refer to 
endorsement of misinformation-consistent answer choices as “Overall False Memory” (OFM). 
Source test. Next, participants completed questions about the source of their answers on 
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the test questions they had just completed. To each of the 18 questions they had previously 
answered, they were given an opportunity to indicate how they arrived at their answers. In this 
source test, they had a multiple choice of five possible answers: (a) I saw it in the picture only, 
(b) I read it in the narrations only, (c) I saw it in both and they were the same, (d) I saw it in both 
and they conflicted with each other, and (e) I guessed.  We refer to 
endorsement of misinformation at test, followed by chosing options (a) or (c) in the source test, 
as Source-Confirmed False Memory (SCFM). 
United 93 crash footage interviews. About 40 minutes after the original suggestion about 
United 93 footage, a research assistant guided participants one at a time through an audio- 
recorded semi-structured interview. In this face-to-face interview, the research assistant 
reiterated to the participant that footage of the crash existed, and then asked if they remembered 
it. In the interview, participants who said "yes" they had seen the footage were then asked follow 
up questions about details (such as “How vivid is your memory of that footage of the crash?” 
and “Tell me how well you can remember having seen the video on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 
means no memory at all and 10 means a very clear memory”; see Supplemental Material for full 
interview script). 
Imagination exercise in the interview. Participants who said "no" they had not seen the 
footage were first told that sometimes traumatic memories fade, but that there are "techniques 
that can help us find those memories." They were then taken through an imagination exercise, in 
which they were asked to imagine seeing the footage on a TV or computer screen. They were 
asked to elaborate on the details they could imagine and given time to visualize what they saw in 
their “mind's eye.” They were then told that some of the details they were imagining were 
exactly consistent with the actual video, and told that this was “really good." They were then 
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asked if they might be remembering the footage. Following this they are asked questions about 
details (e.g., “Do you remember how long the video is?” and the aforementioned “tell me how 
well you can remember having seen the video on a scale from 1 to 10”; see Supplemental 
Material for script). 
Quantitative Coding of Interview Responses 
 
Two research assistants, both blind to all hypotheses, coded the responses to several of 
the key interview questions. Any inter-rater disagreements were scrutinized carefully and 
resolved by a supervising researcher. The questions asking whether they had seen the footage, 
both before and after the imagination inflation exercise were coded in a similar manner (no = 0; 
maybe/unsure = .5; yes = 1), and the initial inter-rater agreement rates on those questions were 
93% and 92% respectively (Cronbach α = .955 and .935). 
Results 
 
We examined whether memory distortion in one paradigm predicted susceptibility to 
distortion in the other paradigms, and we then examined whether individual difference measures 
predicted memory distortion across paradigms. Before the main analysis, we first determined 
whether the memory distortion techniques worked as expected in each paradigm. 
False Memory Rates. Before comparing paradigms, we first examined whether memory 
distortion or change occurred in each of the memory tasks in order to confirm that we are finding 
effects we expect to find based on past research on these memory distortion paradigms. 
Misinformation. In the misinformation experiment, 75% of participants indicated at least 
one Overall False Memory (OFM) in the first memory test, and 49% indicated at least one 
Source-Confirmed False Memory (SCFM) in the subsequent source test. As expected, we found 
a statistically significant misinformation effect. Participants who were exposed to misleading 
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post-event misinformation evidenced significantly higher Overall False Memory (Group A 
misinformation items: t(191) = 2.78, p = .006; B items: t(158.8) = 5.89, p < .0001; non-integer 
degrees of freedom are reduced appropriately when equality of variance was not assumed) and 
Source-Confirmed False Memory (Group A items: t(168.9) = 2.08, p = .037; B items: t(171.8) = 
2.59, p = .010) compared with participants who received no misinformation on those items. The 
misinformation measure used in the correlations presented later in this paper was calculated by 
taking the z-score of the sum of the 6 misinformation items that the participant received. 
Semi-autobiographical Tasks. Of the 202 participants given the suggestion about the 
United 93 footage, 36.6% indicated they had seen the video. Of those, 91.8% provided at least 
one false detail (e.g., how the plane moved/crashed, clarity of footage, length of footage). Such 
details could be indicative of a memory rather than just a belief that they must have seen it. All 
202 participants later participated in the verbal United 93 interview, and following suggestion 
20.3% of them said they had seen the footage and 6.9% said unsure/maybe, with the rest (72.8%) 
saying they had not seen the footage. To test whether the actual suggestion produced the false 
memories, we found that those in a control group who received no suggestion in the computer 
questionnaire did indeed have fewer false reports in the interview 40 minutes later, t(295) = 2.44, 
p = .02. In subsequent analyses below, we used the more conservative measure of false memory 
(i.e. the response in the verbal interview for those who had previously received suggestion). 
Of the 153 participants who then participated in the imagination exercise (those who had 
not said “yes” they had seen the footage initially), 3.9% flipped from a full “no” to a “yes” and 
31.4% increased their certainty of seeing the footage (from a “no” to a “maybe” or a “maybe” to 
a “yes”), with the remainder (64.7%) reporting no change. None of the participants decreased 
their certainty (i.e. no participant had a negative change score that would indicate a change from 
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“yes” or “maybe” to “no”). 
 
In the task that asked for participants’ memory for their emotion in the week following 
9/11, 60.8% reported less negative emotion from Session 1 to Session 2, whereas 34.2% reported 
more negative emotion. The remaining 5.0% remained consistent across sessions (mean change 
= -5.38, SD = 17.44; range -80 to +46). Interestingly, we found that exposure to the 9/11 
questionnaire immediately before posttest increased negative composite emotion memory, F(2, 
290) = 5.81, p = .017 (ANCOVA controlling for pretest scores). In subsequent analyses, 
presented below, we used the absolute value of this inconsistency from pre- to post-test. On this 
absolute composite emotion memory consistency, 12.1% were fairly consistent from one week to 
the next (absolute summed discrepancies between 0 and 5), whereas 87.9% were relatively 
inconsistent (ranging from 6 to 80). The mean absolute composite change in memory of emotion 
was 18.7 (SD = 12.3). 
Internal Consistency of Individual Differences. In order to further check the quality of 
the dataset, we examined the Cronbach’s alpha measures of internal consistency for all the 
standardized individual differences measures. Table 1.1 shows high internal consistency scores 
on most multi-item individual difference measures. All scales range from Cronbach’s alpha of 
.62 to .92, with most measures above α = .7. 
 
====================== 
 
== Table 1.1 about here  == 
 
====================== 
 
Paradigm-to-Paradigm Associations. 
 
Does memory distortion in one paradigm predict susceptibility in other paradigms? Table 1.2 
presents the correlations between memory distortions from misinformation and the 
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autobiographical type measures (suggestion, imagination, and memory for emotion). Figure 1 
represents those correlations in terms of 95% confidence intervals. Most correlations are not 
significant, and effect sizes are in the small range, from r = .01 to .14. Autobiographical memory 
distortion, whether it is related to suggestion, imagination, or memory for emotion, does not 
significantly correlate with false memories in the misinformation paradigm. The only statistically 
significant correlation was between emotion memory inconsistency and the suggestion-generated 
false recall of the United 93 crash, meaning that those who said they had seen the footage also 
were more inconsistent in emotion memory. Surprisingly, there was a non-significant marginal 
negative relationship between misinformation false memories (Source-Confirmed) and emotion 
memory inconsistency. The 9/11-related imagination and suggestion measures could not be 
compared because they were dependent on one another and were both measured in the United 93 
interview. It could be argued that due to multiple tests (7 here) that these p-values (.04 and .07 
respectively) should be interpreted with caution. 
====================== 
 
==   Table 1.2 about here == 
 
====================== 
 
====================== 
 
== Figure 1.1 about here == 
 
====================== 
 
Within Misinformation Paradigm Association 
 
Recall that the misinformation paradigm contained 6 items per participant for which 
misinformation was given, which allowed us to determine if individuals’ performance on three of 
the measures correlated with their performance on the other three. We used a random generator 
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to choose 3 items to be group 1 items, and the other three to be group 2 items, and calculated 
each individual’s number of overall and source-confirmed false memories for each group. We 
found a significant correlation between overall false memories for group 1 items and overall 
false memories on group 2 items (Group A participants: r = .242, p = .019, n = 94; Group B 
participants: r = .404, p < .001, n = 99). For source-confirmed false memory we found one non- 
significant correlation and one significant correlation (Group A: r = .121, p = .247, n = 94; 
Group B: r = 
.352, p < .001, n = 99). 
 
The internal reliability statistic misinformation items on overall false memory was 
Chronbach’s α = .318 for the six Group A items and α = .446 for the six Group B items. For 
source-confirmed false memory, Chronbach’s α = .205 for the six Group A items, and α = .318 
for the six Group B items. 
Individual Differences as Predictors of Memory Distortions 
 
Table S1.1 (see Supplemental Material) shows that only two significant associations 
between demographics and memory distortion: SES correlated with a small effect size with false 
memories of United 93 crash footage following suggestion (r = .155), and political orientation 
correlated with false memories from imagination (r = -.161; liberal orientation predicted slightly 
more false memories). However, because these are small effects and multiple comparisons 
suggest that these associations should be replicated (see Experiment 2). 
Table 1.3 shows that fantasy-proneness significantly predicts false memory for seeing 
crash footage of United 93 following both suggestion and imagination. Those higher on 
dissociation and anxiety also had more false memories following the imagination task. All other 
personality measures did not significantly associate with memory distortions. 
Discussion 
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All participants were exposed to several methods of measuring memory distortions 
(misinformation, crashing memory, imagination, memory of emotion), and we found that 
memory distortion in one paradigm did not predict false memories in other paradigms. In 
addition, relevant individual differences measures, for example fantasy proneness, did not show 
consistent predicative patterns across paradigms. The lack of a correlation between measures is 
in keeping with findings from Hyman and Wilkinson (1998) and Otgaar and Candel (2011), but 
appears to contradict other findings, such as Otgaar et al. (2012). 
There are potential limitations to this study. It is possible that these findings represent a 
type 2 error—a failure to detect a relationship between memory distortion occurrences in 
different paradigms. To address this possibility we established that there is some evidence that 
the quality of these data was acceptable: memory distortions were reliably demonstrated in 
keeping with past research, and individual difference measures had appropriate reliability. 
Nevertheless, there is still a possibility of a type 2 error that is best explored by further research. 
To ensure Experiment 1 replicates, we conducted a similar procedure in Experiment 2., In 
addition, to investigate the relationship between the DRM paradigm and other paradigms, we 
added a DRM word list task to the methodology. 
Experiment 2 
 
Given the small effect sizes in Experiment 1, one significant correlation between 
measures, and the possibility of missing an association that does in fact exist, Experiment 2 
repeats Experiment 1 with a number of changes. As noted earlier, it is unclear whether a 
relationship exists between performance across misinformation, DRM, and autobiographical 
false memory tasks. For this reason we added a DRM task to Experiment 2, as well as other 
changes outlined below. 
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Method 
 
Participants. Undergraduate students (n = 109) and adults in the United States (n = 54), 
totaling 163 subjects, participated for course credit or $40 respectively. Their mean age was 29.0 
(SD = 15.5; range 18–76). Ethnicity was distributed as 37% Asian or Indian, 37% Caucasian, 
14% Hispanic or Latino, 4% Pacific Islander, 4% African American, and 4% Native 
American/Alaskan. We recruited undergraduates using the university subject pool, whereas 
members of the public were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). With this sample 
size, we calculated that our study would be able to find significant effects as low as r = .16 
(G*Power calculation: ρ = .22, α = .05, power = .8, yields N = 159 & critical value of r = .16). 
Materials and procedure. Most materials and procedures were the same as in 
Experiment 1. Session 1 was almost identical to Session 1 Experiment 1, and involved a number 
of individual differences measures and the pretest for the memory for emotion measure. In 
Session 2, the order and timing of some of the memory distortion tasks changed. In Experiment 
2, the timing between the three misinformation phases remained approximately the same, with 
about 40 minutes between event and misinformation phases, and about 20 minutes between 
misinformation and test. However, the United 93 suggestive computer-based questions were 
moved nearer to the end of Session 2, such that the time between the initial false suggestion on 
the computer and the verbal suggestion in the interview was reduced to about 15 minutes. Like 
Experiment 1, the memory for emotion questions came after the suggestion and computer-based 
questions about United 93. The subset of 54 participants recruited on AMT participated on their 
home computer, and the face-to-face interview at the end of Session 2 was conducted via the 
video conferencing program Skype. 
DRM word list task. The most significant change to Experiment 2 was adding the DRM 
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word list task. The task occurred between phase 1 (event) and phase 2 (misinformation 
narratives) of the misinformation task.  Twenty word lists, each 15 words long, were chosen 
from previous research (Roediger et al., 2001). Each word within a list was related to a critical 
lure that was not presented. The 20 critical lures were: Lamp, Trash, Slow, Wish, Foot, Window, 
Soft, Chair, River, Stove, Anger, Justice, City, Rough, Mountain, Music, Thief, Doctor, Cold, 
and Needle (see also Patihis et al., 2013). Following a 10 second (s) preparation screen, words 
were presented onscreen for 1.5 s with a 3 s blank screen between lists. After the words were 
presented, participants completed one filler-task page (~3 minutes) before participating in a 
recognition test. In the recognition test, they had to determine whether the test word had been 
previously shown a few minutes earlier (by choosing “old”) or whether the word had not been 
presented (by choosing “new”). The test was not time-limited. 
Results 
 
False memory rates. As in Experiment 1, we first document memory distortion or 
change occurred in each of the memory tasks. 
DRM. Of the 163 participants, all had at least one recognition of critical lures that were 
not actually presented with a mean of 12.9 out of 20 (64.5%; range 1 to 20; M = 12.9, SD = 
4.45). The mean of correct recognition of words that were presented was 12.7 out of 20 (63.5%; 
SD = 3.50; range 1 to 19). In contrast, the mean of false endorsement of words not presented (not 
critical lures) was 4.1 out of 20 (20.5%; SD = 3.87; range 0 to 16). These statistics are consistent 
with past research (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger et al, 2001), which has shown 
similar percentages of critical lure endorsement and presented word endorsement (here both 
around 64%) and much lower percentages for endorsement of non-presented, non-lure words 
(here around 20.5%). We found no statistical differences between critical-lure and presented- 
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word endorsement, t(162) = .479, p = .633; however, we did find a significant difference 
between critical lure endorsement and non-presented non-lure endorsement, t(162) = 25.5, p < 
.0001. 
 
Misinformation. Of the 163 participants who completed the misinformation task, 85.9% 
indicated at least one overall false memory in the first test, and 57.7% indicated at least one 
source-confirmed false memory in the subsequent source test. As expected, we found a 
statistically significant misinformation effect, although only in three of the four comparisons. 
Participants exposed to misleading post-event misinformation had significantly higher overall 
false memory (Group A misinformation items: t(107) = 3.67, p < .001; B items: t(107) = 2.25, p 
= .027) and source-confirmed false memory on Group A misinformation items (t(76.1) = 2.43, p 
 
= .017), but not on Group B misinformation items (t(105.8) = 1.12, p = .265), although the latter 
finding was in the expected direction. The classic misinformation effect was reproduced for 
overall false memory, and partially for source-confirmed false memory. 
Semi-autobiographical   Tasks. 
 
Suggestion. Of the 163 participants completing the United 93 computer questionnaire 48 
(29.4%) indicated they had seen the footage. Of these, 47 (97.9%) indicated a score of 2 or above 
on a 10 point Likert scale in response to the question “How well do you remember seeing the 
footage?” (1 = no memory at all; 10 = a very clear memory) and 40 (83.3%) reported some false 
detail about the footage. In the subsequent interview, approximately 15 minutes later, 16.7% of 
the participants said they had seen the footage, 8.0% said maybe, and 75.3% said they had not 
seen it. 
Imagination. Of the 133 participants who participated in the imagination exercise, 8.3% 
changed from a “no” before to a “yes” after the exercise, 33.8% went from a “no” to a “maybe” 
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or a “maybe” to a “yes”, with 54.1% showing no change. Five participants (3.8%) had a negative 
change score. 
Memory for Emotion. Of the 163 people completing the 9/11 memory of emotion 
questionnaire, 52.8% reduced the frequency of negative emotion remembered from Session 1 to 
Session 2, 43.5% increased, with 3.7% were consistent (mean change = -1.94, SD = 18.6; range - 
62 to +59). We use the absolute value of this inconsistency in subsequent analyses, presented 
below. On this absolute composite emotion memory consistency, 8.0% were fairly consistent 
from one week to the next (absolute summed discrepancies between 0 and 5), whereas 92.0% 
were relatively inconsistent (ranging from 6 to 64). The mean absolute composite change in 
memory for emotion was 20.9 (SD = 12.05). 
Internal consistency of individual differences. As in Experiment 1, to establish the 
quality of the data obtained for multi-item measures in the study, we examined the Cronbach’s 
alpha statistic for internal consistency for the individual differences measures. Table 2.1 shows 
high internal consistency scores on most multi-item individual difference measures, many of 
which included reverse coded items. Similar to Experiment 1, we found that apart from the 
composite of critical and flexible thinking items, all other items ranged from Cronbach’s alpha 
of .65 (adequately internally consistent) to .92 (high internal consistency). 
====================== 
 
== Table 2.1 about here  == 
 
====================== 
 
Paradigm to paradigm associations. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the within-subjects associations between memory distortions from 
misinformation, DRM word lists, and the autobiographical-type measures (suggestion, 
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imagination, memory for emotion). Figure 2 represents the 95% confidence intervals of those 
correlations in graphical form. Most correlations were not significant, and effect sizes are in the 
small range, ranging from r = .01 to .20. Unlike Experiment 1, there were a couple of 
autobiographical memory distortions that significantly correlated with false memories in the 
misinformation paradigm. Surprisingly, suggestion-induced false reports of United 93 footage 
were significantly negatively correlated with overall false memories in the classic 
misinformation task (r = -.20). Emotion memory inconsistency was significantly positively 
correlated with misinformation. Unlike Experiment 1, there was no statistically significant 
correlation between emotion memory inconsistency and the suggestion-generated false recall of 
United 93. As noted earlier, due to multiple tests (13 here) the significant p-values of .01 and .02 
should be treated with caution, and it should be noted that these correlations were not 
statistically reliable in Experiment 1. Memory distortions in the DRM word list task (summed 
critical lure hits) did not significantly correlate with the misinformation task (z-score of sum of 6 
items) nor with the semi-autobiographical measures. 
====================== 
 
== Table 2.2 about here  == 
 
====================== 
 
====================== 
 
== Figure 2.1 about here == 
 
====================== 
 
Within Paradigm Associations 
 
Misinformation. We found no significant within-paradigm association between overall 
false memory on 3 randomly chosen items and false memory rates on the other 3 items (Group A 
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participants: r = .179, p = .116, n = 78; Group B participants: r = .162, p = .139, n = 85). For 
source-confirmed false memory rates we found one significant and one non-significant within- 
paradigm association (Group A participants: r = .165, p = .149, n = 78; Group B participants: r = 
.269, p = .013, n = 85). 
 
A meta-analysis (random effects, weighted, unbiased) of the Experiment 1 and 2 within- 
misinformation paradigm effect sizes gives an overall effect of r = .25, 95% CI [.14, .35], p = 
.003 for overall false memory; and r = .23, 95% CI [.12, .33], p = .005 for source-confirmed 
false memory. 
The internal reliability statistic misinformation items on overall false memory was 
Chronbach’s α = .338 for the six Group A items and α = .318 for the six Group B items. For 
source-confirmed false memory, Chronbach’s α = ..438 for the six Group A items, and α = .286 
for the six Group B items. 
DRM. After randomly choosing 10 critical lures from the 20 in our study as group 1 
items, and the rest as group 2 items, we calculated false endorsement rates for each participant 
for the two groups of items. We found a significant correlation between the number of group 1 
critical lures recognized by a participant and the number of group 2 critical lures they endorsed (r 
= .674, p < .001, N = 163). Participants who reported recognizing more critical lures on a 
random sample of 10 critical lures tended to also recognize critical lures in the other 10 critical 
lures. The internal reliability statistic for the 20 DRM critical lure items was Chronbach’s α = 
.821. 
 
Associations between Individual Differences and Memory Distortion Measures 
 
Table S2.1 in the Supplemental Material shows the association of demographic and other 
variables with one measure of memory distortion/inconsistency from each of the five tasks. 
FALSE MEMORY PREDICTION 29 
 
 
Although age significantly correlated with critical lure endorsement in the DRM test (r = .17), 
and critical thinking negatively significantly correlated with source-confirmed false memories in 
the misinformation task (r = -.16), no other significant correlations were found. Note that the 
association between critical thinking and source-confirmed false memory from misinformation 
did not occur in Experiment 1. Gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, political orientation, 
SAT scores, handedness, alcohol use and bilingualism all had little or no association with 
memory distortions in this sample (all p’s > .05). 
Table 2.3 shows the correlations between personality measures and memory 
distortion/inconsistency measures. Higher trait stress susceptibility (SSP) negatively predicted 
critical lure endorsement in the DRM task (r = -.16). However, the significant predictors from 
Experiment 1 (absorption, fantasy proneness, & anxiety) did not replicate—they were not 
significant predictors in Experiment 2. Due to multiple testing and a failure to replicate across 
Experiments 1 and 2, these individual difference measures are not adequately diagnostic of 
susceptibility in any of our memory distortion measures. Perhaps surprisingly, the following 
were not consistently predictors of false memory: absorption, dissociation, and fantasy 
proneness. In addition, mindfulness,  trait anxiety, assertiveness, impulsiveness, adventure 
seeking, detachment, social desirability, embitterment, irritability, mistrust, and trait aggression 
all had little or no association with memory distortion susceptibility. 
Across both experiments, no single individual difference measure predicted memory 
distortions across more than one task. Notably, internal reliability was very high on most 
individual differences measures, and each paradigm was effective in producing memory 
distortions (e.g. significant misinformation effects for both slideshows and news footage, as well 
as false memories in DRM and false news footage). 
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Age confound check. Due to past research on older eyewitness and memory distortions 
(e.g., Wylie et al., 2014) there was a concern that because 12 participants were over age 60, this 
might confound the results. For that reason in the Supplemental material we repeated the main 
analysis excluding the 12 participants over age 60. We found the same pattern of results (Tables 
S2.2, S2.3, S2.4), indicating age was not a confound. 
Recruitment method confound check. Correlations between memory distortion 
paradigms within students who were recruited from the university subject pool (Table S2.5), and 
within those recruited via AMT (Table S2.6), were all in the same negligible to small effect size 
range (-.30 < rs < .21; just 2 of 26 comparisons statistically significant at α = .05). 
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 2 revealed no substantial relationship between memory 
distortions among the paradigms: misinformation, DRM, crashing memory, imagination, and 
memory for emotion. We also found individual differences did not predict memory distortions 
across paradigms. As in Experiment 1, we examined indicators of data quality, such as expected 
memory distortion patterns and internal reliability statistics, and these indicated participants were 
likely sufficiently engaged in the study. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, with the 
additional finding that the DRM paradigm was also not related to the other paradigms. In 
particular, the lack of a correlation between the DRM and misinformation are in keeping with 
some past research (e.g., Ost et al., 2013), although small effects have been found occasionally 
(e.g., (e.g. Zhu et al., 2013). We discuss the deeper implications on these results next in the 
general discussion. 
General Discussion 
 
In two experiments, we found consistent memory distortion effects that replicate previous 
research. We also found high internal consistency scores in standardized individual differences 
measures. Most importantly, we found a dearth of evidence that memory distortion in one type 
of task consistently predicted susceptibility to memory distortion in other paradigms. Small but 
FALSE MEMORY PREDICTION 31 
 
statistically significant associations did not replicate from one experiment to the next. We also 
found that no single individual difference measure consistently predicted memory distortion 
susceptibility across false memory tasks and across the two experiments.  
These findings, combined with converging current research (Bernstein, Scoboria, 
Desjarlais, & Soucie, 2017) and past research (e.g. Ost et al., 2013), suggest that it may be 
difficult to identify false-memory prone individuals who are especially susceptible to memory 
distortions in different contexts. Even though small statistically significant relationships have 
been found in previous research (e.g. Zhu et al., 2013), we did not replicate those relationships 
here. Instead, we found that the number of false memories in the DRM word list task did not 
predict memory distortion in the misinformation task, as did Ost et al., (2013). Whether these 
associations are small or negligible, we concur with Zhu et al.’s (2013) suggestion that different 
memory mechanisms are involved in the formation of false memories within each task. Semantic 
memory spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975) may account, at least in part, for the DRM 
effect, whereas source-memory fading and subsequent source monitoring errors (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) can explain much of the misinformation effect. Note that both our 
DRM and misinformation effect measured recognition, and future research could investigate 
recall in both paradigms. We echo Ost et al.’s (2013) conclusion that false memory in one 
paradigm cannot be equated to false memory in another paradigm. When using the term “false 
memory,” it might be advisable to add qualifiers such as “from misinformation,” “for 
autobiographical memory,” or “for semantically related words,” for example. 
We also found no relationship between false memory performance in tasks involving 
laboratory based stimuli and tasks that invite participants to recall information from significant 
news events (9/11) that are semi-autobiographical in nature. It is possible that responses in the 
crashing memory paradigm reflect beliefs more than they do memory, and that may explain low 
correlations between these paradigms (see Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009). 
However, we did attempt to code our crashing memory measure in such a way as to establish the 
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presence of memories. This lack of a relationship may add weight to Roediger and McDermott’s 
(2013) commentary that there seems to be emerging evidence that there are two types of event 
memory: one involving laboratory-based stimuli and the other involving autobiographical 
stimuli (see also Mazzoni, 2002). The lack of a relationship that replicated between laboratory-
based memory distortion and autobiographical memory distortion in our study is in keeping with 
findings from Hyman and Wilkinson (1998) and Otgaar and Candel (2011), but appears to 
contradict other findings, such as Otgaar et al. (2012) and Clancy et al. (2002). These 
contradictory findings notwithstanding, after consideration of all findings and all the potential 
problems in several of these studies, it is clear that DRM false memories should not be regarded 
as reliably predictive of autobiographical false memories. 
We are skeptical that false memory tasks carry sufficient predictive power that they can 
be used as diagnostic tools. Among adults with unimpaired memory, there is currently no 
reliable way to identify a “false memory trait” or consistent proneness to memory distortion. It is 
increasingly clear that most individuals are vulnerable to memory distortions, which arise from 
mechanisms common to all humans. This vulnerability is in keeping with the finding that even 
people with strikingly superior memory abilities are susceptible to memory distortions in 
laboratory tasks (Patihis et al., 2013). False memory proneness may only meaningfully vary with 
respect to individuals with memory impairments, whereas all other individuals can develop false 
memories given the right circumstances. It would seem that nobody is immune to memory 
distortion. 
However, there may be an, as yet, undiscovered group of people who are notably less 
susceptible across memory distortion paradigms, although support for such a claim would 
require replicable and robust evidence. The lack of predictive power of so many individual 
difference measures illustrates how difficult it is to predict memory distortions. Indeed, no 
correlation of an individual difference measure with memory distortion measures across the two 
experiments was greater than r = .20. Only one correlation across both studies was statistically 
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significant at p = .01.  One could argue that given the large number of comparisons that this was 
a chance finding. Alternatively, if we used a correction of α = .001, none of the findings would 
be significant.  Even with a liberal critical value of α = .05, the correlational findings were 
generally not revealing of a consistent meaningful relationship. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that some individual differences directly related to memory ability, such as working memory 
capacity (Watson, Bunting, Poole, Conway, 2005, using DRM task) and memory decline in older 
age (older versus younger adults; Wylie et al., 2014, misinformation task), seem to be more 
reliably associated with memory distortion susceptibility. 
In the introduction, we noted that false memories associated with many of the paradigms 
we studied can be explained by source monitoring errors, in particular misinformation, crashing 
memory, and imagination inflation; and to a lesser extent, DRM and memory of emotion. Yet 
despite these shared mechanisms, what does it mean that we did not find sizable correlations 
among the paradigms? Such null findings or low effect sizes could have a variety of 
explanations. One explanation could be that there is low reliability in the measures, perhaps due 
to correlations among items within a given paradigm, or not having sufficient items to sum in 
some measures to establish high reliability. Another explanation could be that despite the 
presence of shared mechanisms, mechanisms differ in certain respect across paradigms. For 
example, memory for photos, words, and news events may all engender false memories via 
different mechanisms during encoding, storage, or retrieval. Another possibility is that although 
source monitoring is a shared mechanism across tasks, source-monitoring susceptibility might 
not be a stable personal tendency that varies from person-to-person (i.e. it is not trait-like). 
We also found that within paradigm correlations were small with respect to the 
misinformation effect, and moderate in the DRM. These measures are memory tasks, not 
personality measures, and that these within-paradigm correlations are small reinforces the our 
main finding that memory distortion susceptibility does not behave like a trait or tendency. This 
implies that false memories in one domain are not only poor predictors of false memories in 
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other paradigms, but also not very diagnostic of false memory susceptibility within the same 
domain. These findings may replicate in future research. It is not uncommon for useful 
measures to, nevertheless, exhibit low internal reliability if the items do not measure the same 
thing (e.g., trauma type subscales: Nijenhuis, Van der Hart, & Kruger, 2002; or different 
aspects of rationality: Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016).  Accordingly, low internal 
consistency may be one possible reason for small or negligible correlations among measures. 
Yet such low correlations may be difficult to avoid because: (1) low correlations reflect the 
“true state of affairs” such that false memories do not predict one another within the same 
domain, (2) within- subjects tests are cognitively taxing for participants, and (3) it is difficult to 
disguise the true purpose of the study in experiments in which participants are administered too 
many false memory items. Whatever the explanation, we found that false memories did not 
adequately predict other false memories regardless of whether we summed items or analyzed 
them on an item-to-item basis. The one exception might pertain to the DRM task, but even 
within this paradigm, item-to-item correlations were not very high, and perhaps would be lower 
if the items were not all presented and tested so close together in time. One possible reason 
internal correlations were higher within the DRM items, compared with misinformation items, 
is the different mechanisms involved. Semantic networks (utilized in the DRM task) may be 
relatively stable within-persons and vary among persons, whereas source monitoring (utilized 
in the misinformation task) may not be as trait-like. 
Our two experiments have a number of limitations that might be addressed in future 
research. For example, the autobiographical tasks involving suggestion and imagination were 
both related to the same news event (United 93 on 9/11).  As a result of this overlap, we were 
unable to test the relationship between suggestion-induced autobiographical false memory and 
imagination-induced memory distortion. Future research could utilize different target events 
for these tasks. Likewise, memory for emotion could be investigated with a more elaborate 
design, for example, by obtaining appraisal measures before and after the manipulation (e.g. 
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Levine et al., 2001). Moreover, future research could investigate different variations of 
paradigms—for example, using recall in the DRM task, a video in the misinformation task, or 
an autobiographical personal memory that is not news-related. 
Our findings may be useful in various domains. For instance, legal or clinical 
practitioners may benefit from knowing that it will be difficult (or perhaps impossible) to 
establish whether a given eyewitness or client is prone to memory distortion based on a single 
task or paradigm. A relevant recent example is a court case that raises the question of whether an 
alleged victim’s autobiographical memory of abuse was true or false. One expert witness made 
the argument that because the alleged victim scored low on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
it “shows she is not the type of person who is memory suggestible” (Doe v. Hartford Roman 
Catholic, 2014; p. 232; Gudjonsson, 1984). Practically speaking, the ecological validity of 
memory distortion paradigms have not been studied sufficiently to argue for their diagnostic use 
in the field to predict memory distortion susceptibility in another setting. The best assumption 
for practitioners is that clients, whatever their personality and even if they claim to possess 
exceptional memory, may be vulnerable to memory distortions. 
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Table 1.1 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Internal Consistency Scores for Multi-item Individual Difference Measures in 
Experiment 1 
Individual Difference Measure Cronbach’s Alpha 
Dispositional Variables: 
Absorption (Tellegen Absorption Scalea; 34 items) 
 
.920 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-Cb; 28 items) .712 
Fantasy Prone (Creative Experiences Scalec; 25 items) .729 
Mindfulness (MAAS; 15 item) .878 
Basic Empathy Scaled  (20 items) .811 
Affective Empathy (BES; 11 items) .809 
Cognitive Empathy (BES; 9 items) .700 
Personality Traits (SSP; 91 items):  
Somatic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .693 
Psychic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .744 
Stress Susceptibility (7 items) .658 
Lack Of Assertiveness (7 items) .698 
Impulsiveness (7 items) .682 
Adventure Seeking (7 items) .782 
Detachment (7 items) .618 
Social Desirability (7 items) .670 
Embitterment (7 items) .654 
Trait Irritability (7 items) .821 
Mistrust (7 items) .779 
Verbal Trait Aggression (7 items) .665 
Physical Trait Aggression (7 items) .828 
Political Variables:  
Belief in a Dangerous World (12 item) .819 
Political Orientation (3 item) .826 
Note. This table analysis includes participants in memory distortion control conditions, so N = 
390. All measures demonstrate adequate to high internal consistency. aTellegen & Atkinson, 
1974. bWright & Loftus, 1999. cMerckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001. d Jolliffe & 
Farrington (2006). MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003). SSP = 
Swedish Scale of Personality (Gustavsson et al., 2000). 
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Table 1.2  
Experiment 1 Intercorrelations between Memory Distortion Measures 
 
 Suggestion: U93 
Crash Footagea 
 
 
Imagination: U93 
Crash Footageb 
 
 
Emotion Memory 
Inconsistencyc 
  r 95% CI   r 95% CI   r 95% CI 
Misinformation OFMz  .048 [-.09, .19]   -.009 [-.17, .15]   .070 [-.07, .21] 
Misinformation SCFMz  -.010 [-.15, .13]   -.032 [-.19, .13]   -.134 [-.27, .01] 
Suggestion: U93 Crash  — —   — —   .144 [.005, .28] 
Imagination: U93 Crash  — —   — —   .027 [-.13, .19] 
Notes. Significant correlation shown in boldface. aUnited 93 crash interview verbal 
response following suggestion to “Have you seen that footage?” (Coded “yes” = 0, “maybe” 
= .5, “no” = 0). bChange in whether they reported seeing the footage from before to after 
the imagination exercise in the United 93 crash interview (coded 1 for a change from “no” 
before to “yes” afterwards, .5 for a change from “no” to “maybe” or “maybe” to “yes”, and 
0 for no change). cThe absolute value of the composite change in memory for negative 
emotions after 911, from week 1 to week 2. OFMz = overall false memory (z-adjusted 
around misinformation group mean). SCFMz = source-confirmed false memory (z-
adjusted). By design our 9/11 related imagination and suggestion measures could not be 
compared. 
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Table 1.3 
Associations of Personality Measures with Memory Paradigms for Experiment 1 
 
 Misinfo 
SCFMz a 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination: 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
     
Absorption (TAS) .062 .033 .200 -.017 
Dissociation (DES-C) -.052 .081 .168* .042 
Fantasy Prone (CEQ) .068 .182** .195* .094 
Mindfulness (MAAS) .101 -.041 -.111 -.071 
Empathy (BES) .005 .049 -.002 -.031 
     
Personality Traits (SSP)     
      Somatic Anxiety .029 .022 .188* .007 
      Psychic Anxiety .046 -.051 .172* -.007 
      Stress Susceptibility .042 .016 .094 .038 
      Lack of Assertiveness -.037 -.071 .212 .031 
      Impulsiveness -.010 .029 -.004 .005 
      Adventure Seeking -.015 -.015 .102 .044 
      Detachment -.046 -.160 .016 -.048 
      Social Desirability -.060 -.008 -.086 -.035 
      Embitterment .025 -.030 .133 -.001 
      Irritability -.101 .045 .122 .047 
      Mistrust .077 -.048 .097 .024 
      Verbal Aggression -.040 .012 -.089 -.034 
      Physical Aggression -.026 -.040 -.014 .021 
     
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations at α = .05 are shown in 
boldface. † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01.  
a Source-Confirmed False Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). N  = 193. b False report of seeing 
United 93 crash footage in the interview, following initial suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 
0 = no). N = 202. c Increase in certainty of seeing United 93 crash footage following the 
imagination inflation exercise in the interview. N = 153. d Absolute value of the change, from 
Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt negative emotion in the week following September 11, 2001. 
N = 199. TAS = Tellegen Absorption Scale. DES-C = Dissociative Experiences Scale, version C. 
CEQ = Creative Experiences Questionnaire.  MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale. BES 
= Basic Empathy Scale. SSP = Swedish Universities Scale of Personality.  
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Table 2.1 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Internal Consistency Scores for Multi-item Individual Difference Measures in 
Experiment 2 
Individual Difference Measure Cronbach’s Alpha 
Dispositional Variables: 
Absorption (Tellegen Absorption Scale, TAS; 34 items)a 
 
.921 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES-C; 28 items)b .917 
Fantasy Prone (Creative Experiences Scale, CEQ; 25 items)c .767 
Mindfulness (MAAS; 15 item) .891 
Basic Empathy Scale (20 items)d .800 
Affective Empathy (BES; 11 items) .795 
Cognitive Empathy (BES; 9 items) .754 
Personality Traits (SSP; 91 items):  
Somatic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .696 
Psychic Trait Anxiety (7 items) .793 
Stress Susceptibility (7 items) .724 
Lack Of Assertiveness (7 items) .780 
Impulsiveness (7 items) .646 
Adventure Seeking (7 items) .859 
Detachment (7 items) .670 
Social Desirability (7 items) .649 
Embitterment (7 items) .732 
Trait Irritability (7 items) .809 
Mistrust (7 items) .793 
Verbal Trait Aggression (7 items) .771 
Physical Trait Aggression (7 items) .867 
Political Variables:  
Belief in a Dangerous World (12 item) .872 
Political Orientation (3 item) .837 
Note. N = 163. All measures here demonstrate adequate to high internal consistency. aTellegen & 
Atkinson, 1974. bWright & Loftus, 1999. cMerckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001. d Jolliffe 
& Farrington (2006). MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003). SSP 
= Swedish Scale of Personality (Gustavsson et al., 2000) 
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Table 2.2  
Experiment 2 Intercorrelations between Memory Distortion Measures 
 DRM critical lures 
endorsed 
 Suggestion: U93 
Crasha 
 
 
Imagination: U93 
Crashb 
 
 
Emotion Memory 
Inconsistencyc 
  r 95% CI   r 95% CI   r 95% CI   r 95% CI 
Misinfo 
OFMz  .014 [-.14, .17]   -.196 [-.34, -.04]   .119 [-.04, .27]   .094 [-.06, .24] 
Misinfo 
SCFMz  .007 [-.15, .16]  
 -.113 [-.26, .04]   .166 [-.004, .33]   .177 [.02, .32] 
Suggest: 
Crash   .045 [-.11, .20]  
 — —   — —   .009 [-.15, .16] 
Imagin: 
Crash   .055 [-.12, .22]   — —   — —   -.079 [-.25, .09] 
Emotion 
Mem,  -.038 [-.19, .12]   — —   — —   — — 
Notes. Significant correlations shown in boldface. aUnited 93 crash interview verbal 
response following suggestion to “Have you seen that footage?” (Coded “yes” = 0, “maybe” 
= .5, “no” = 0). bChange in whether they reported seeing the footage from before to after the 
imagination exercise in the United 93 crash interview (coded 1 for a change from “no” 
before to “yes” afterwards, .5 for a change from “no” to “maybe” or “maybe” to “yes”, and 
0 for no change). cThe absolute value of the composite change in memory for negative 
emotions after 911, from week 1 to week 2. OFMz = overall false memory (z-adjusted 
around misinformation group mean). SCFMz = Source-Confirmed false memory (z-
adjusted). N = 163 apart from those involving the imagination task where N = 133. 
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Table 2.3 
Associations of Personality Measures with Memory Paradigms for Experiment 2 
 
 DRM Lures 
Endorsed 
Misinfo 
SCFMa 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
      
Absorption (TAS) -.001 -.035 .048 .043 .025 
Dissociation (DES-C) .045 -.055 .102 -.056 -.080 
Fantasy Prone (CEQ) .002 -.005 .031 .063 -.070 
Mindfulness (MAAS) .089 .033 -.044 -.018 .034 
Empathy (BES) .017 -.029 -.016 .045 -.009 
      
Personality Traits 
(SSP) 
     
    Somatic Anxiety -.015 .003 .039 -.014 .078 
    Psychic Anxiety -.071 .053 -.023 -.069 -.064 
    Stress Suscept. -.156* -.029 -.002 -.114 -.090 
    Lack Assertiveness -.086 -.057 -.054 -.082 -.069 
    Impulsiveness .063 .014 -.042 -.079 .075 
    Adventure Seeking .018 -.062 .048 .007 .066 
   Detachment -.087 .078 -.008 -.071 .077 
    Social Desirability .056 .011 .066 .014 .126 
    Embitterment -.138† .084 -.028 -.030 -.013 
    Irritability -.023 <.001 -.043 -.113 .039 
    Mistrust -.103 .152† -.035 -.075 .020 
    Verbal Aggression .002 .002 .046 -.028 -.053 
    Physical Aggression .049 .085 .006 -.047 <.001 
      
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations at α = .05 are shown in 
boldface. † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01. N = 163 for each column except the imagination column 
where N = 133. 
a Source-Confirmed False Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). b False report of seeing United 93 
crash footage in the interview, following initial suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 0 = no). c 
Increase in certainty of seeing United 93 crash footage following the imagination inflation 
exercise in the interview. d Absolute value of the change, from Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt 
negative emotion in the week following September 11, 2001. TAS = Tellegen Absorption Scale. 
DES-C = Dissociative Experiences Scale, version C. CEQ = Creative Experiences 
Questionnaire.  MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale. BES = Basic Empathy Scale. SSP 
= Swedish Universities Scale of Personality.
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Figure 1. Experiment 1: within-subject memory distortion paradigm to paradigm correlations, r, 
with 95% CI of r. Most correlations were not statistically significant, p > .05, except the 
correlation between Emotion Memory Consistency and United 93 Crash Suggestion, p = .048. 
As shown, the effect size for most comparisons is close to zero, with the CI crossing zero. 
Paradigm pair 1 = Misinformation OFMz & Crash Suggestion. 2 = Misinformation SCFMz & 
Crash Suggestion. 3 = Misinformation OFMz & Crash Imagination. 4 = Misinformation SCFMz 
& Crash Imagination. 5 = Misinformation OFMz & Emotion Memory. 6 = Misinformation 
SCFMz & Emotion Memory. 7 = Emotion Memory & Crash Suggestion. 8 = Emotion Memory 
& Crash Suggestion. See Table 2 for numeric values. 
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Figure 2. Within subject memory paradigm to paradigm correlations, r, with 95% CI of r. As shown, the 
effect size for most comparisons are close to zero, with the CI crossing zero (p’s> 
.05), see text for exceptions. Paradigm pair 1 = DRM & Misinformation (OFMz). 2 = DRM & Crash 
Suggestion. 3 = DRM & Crash Imagination. 4 = DRM & Emotion Memory. 5 = Misinformation & Crash 
Suggestion. 6 = Misinformation& Crash Imagination 7 = Misinformation & Emotion Memory. 8 = Emotion 
Memory & Crash Suggestion. 9 = Emotion Memory & Crash Imagination. For numeric values and 
misinformation SCFM values see Table 4.
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Supplemental Method and Material 
 
United 93 Interview Script 
The last thing is a 5 minute recorded interview that is anonymous and confidential, so we will just use your 
participant number during the interview, and not your name. Please speak as freely as possible and answer all of 
questions with as much detail as you can. We are looking for what you really remember, there are no right or wrong 
answers, and it is okay if there is anything you cannot remember. 
[AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH INTERVIEW START THE RECORDING WITH THE FOLLOWING 
WORDS] 
 
“This is participant number _ _ _ _” 
I want to ask you a few questions about how well you remember news events. As you might recall, on 
September 11, 2001, two planes were flown into the world trade center in New York City, one plane was flown into 
the Pentagon in Washington DC, and another plane, United 93 crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania. The plane 
crash in Pennsylvania is the event we are interested in asking you about.  
The other crashes on 9/11 have already been studied, so we are focusing only on United 93, the one that 
crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.  
Are you familiar with this event? 
Can you tell me what you remember about the event? 
[LISTEN TO CHECK THEY UNDERSTAND IT IS ABOUT THE CRASH INTO THE FIELD] 
 
As you might know, a witness on the ground in Pennsylvania took some video of the plane crashing and it 
has been widely shown on TV news and the Internet in the months and years since the attack.  
Do you remember seeing that footage? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
[IF YES] 
Can you tell me what you remember about the footage? 
[FREE RESPONSE] 
Can you describe how the plane moved in the footage? 
Do you remember how the plane crashed in the video? 
How did you feel when you saw the footage of United 93 crash in Pennsylvania? 
How vivid is your memory of that footage of the crash? 
Do you remember how long the video is? 
Do you remember if the video had sound? 
If you did see the footage, where did you see it first? (Was it on the internet or TV, if so which channel) 
Can you remember any additional details? Take a moment to think if you like. 
 
Okay, now I’d like you to tell me how well you can remember having seen the video on a scale from 1 to 10 , where 
1 means no memory at all and 10 means a very clear memory. [END OF INTERVIEW] 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
[IF NO] 
FALSE MEMORY PREDICT  2 
Sometimes memories fade so we can’t remember them, especially ones that are unpleasant or traumatic. 
However, we can use techniques that can help us find those memories. 
[TALK SLOWLY, RAPPORT] If you don’t mind, I’d like for you to close your eyes for a few moments. 
I would like you to use your imagination and try to picture what the footage may have looked like. Imagine you are 
watching it on your television or your computer screen. You are watching a video of the plane crashing, taken by a 
witness who is standing in a grassy field near the crash site. Just take a few moments and let any images or sounds 
come into your head.  
[LET MORE THAN 30 SECONDS PASS DURING THIS EXERCISE, INCLUDING 10 SECONDS OF 
SILENCE AFTER THE LAST SENTENCE] 
Keeping your eyes closed, can you describe to me what you are seeing in your mind's eye?  
[PARTICIPANT RESPONDS  -  WAIT FOR THEM TO STOP TALKING AND WAIT A FEW SECONDS 
BEFORE MOVING ON] 
Can you describe how the plane moves? 
Describe how the plane crashes in the video? 
What does the aftermath look like? 
What about the people filming the video, do you hear them talking? 
(You can now open your eyes). 
 
Actually, several of the details you are giving me are exactly consistent with the video. So that’s really 
good. Do you feel like you might be remembering the footage? 
Do you remember how long the video is? 
Where would you have been when you first saw it, right after 9/11? 
Do you remember how you felt after seeing it? 
Can you remember any additional details? Take a moment to think, if you like. 
 
Okay, now I’d like you to tell me how well you can remember having seen the video on a scale from 1 to 
10 , where 1 means no memory at all and 10 means a very clear memory. 
 
Okay, now that the interview is over, I would like to ask you just one last question - Did you indicate that 
you had seen the United 93 footage in the computer questionnaire? 
[If Yes]: Can you tell me why your answer changed from yes to no between the computer questionnaire 
and this interview? [END OF INTERVIEW] 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Supplemental Results for Experiment 1 
 
Table S1.1 
Associations of Individual Differences with Memory Paradigms for Experiment 1 
 Misinfo 
SCFMa 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination: 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
Demographics     
   Gendere -.019 .025 .078 .026 
   Age -.039 -.027 -.041 .076 
   Ethnicityf -.037 .069 -.011 .023 
   Family SES -.011 .155* .030 .054 
   Year in College .019 .038 -.015 .084 
   Major in Collegeg .099 -.033 -.005 -.020 
   Political Orientationh -.003 .002 -.161* -.087 
Cognitive Ability     
   SAT Total -.011 .059 -.150 -.104 
   Rationality measures     
   Critical Thinking Score -.050 -.056 -.107 -.056 
   Flexible Thinking Scale -.127† .028 .032 -.016 
Other     
   Handedness -.049 .010 .014 .041 
   Alcohol Use .021 .082 .011 .027 
   Number Fluent Languages .113 .065 .030 .092 
     
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations are in boldface (α = .05). † p < .1, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, a Source-Confirmed False Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). N = 193. b False report of seeing United 93 
crash footage in the interview, following initial suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 0 = no). N  = 202. c Increase 
in certainty of seeing United 93 crash footage following the imagination exercise in the interview. N = 153. d 
Absolute value of the change, from Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt negative emotion in the week following 
September 11, 2001. N =  199. e Males coded 1, females 2. f Point by serial correlation: Caucasian (coded 1) vs. non-
Caucasian (coded 0). g Psychology/criminology (eyewitness testimony related subjects) coded 1, others coded 0. h 
Summed average of social, fiscal, and foreign policy political orientations, with Likert scales from very liberal (1) to 
very conservative (7), j "Yes" coded as 1, "No" coded as 0. k Likert scale from 1 (not at all patriotic) to 10 (extremely 
patriotic). l Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree). 
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Supplemental Results for Experiment 2 
 
Table S2.1 
Associations of Individual Differences with Memory Paradigms for Experiment 2 
 
 DRM Lures 
Endorsed 
Misinfo 
SCFMa 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
Demographics      
   Gendere -.002 .013 .065 -.029 .147† 
   Age .168* .097 -.090 .113 .063 
   Ethnicityf -.068 -.093 .037 .130 -.038 
   Family SES .102 -.088 .087 .101 -.093 
   Political Orientationh .058 .042 -.068 .081 .014 
Cognitive Ability      
   SAT Total -.159 -.103 -.001 -.210† .037 
   Rationality measures      
   Critical Thinking .083 -.159* -.011 .013 -.116 
   Flexible Thinking .070 -.046 .022 -.109 -.070 
Other      
   Handedness -.118 .044 -.024 .196 .070 
   Alcohol Use .002 -.145† -.007 .048 -.111 
   Number Fluent Lang .030 .001 .092 -.183 .117 
      
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations are in boldface (α = .05). † p < .1, * p < .05, 
** p < .01. N = 163 for each column except the imagination column where N = 133.  a Source-Confirmed False 
Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). b False report of seeing United 93 crash footage in the interview, following initial 
suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 0 = no). c Increase in certainty of seeing United 93 crash footage following the 
imagination exercise in the interview. d Absolute value of the change, from Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt 
negative emotion in the week following September 11, 2001. eFemales coded 1, males 0. f Point by serial correlation: 
Caucasian (coded 1) vs. non-Caucasian (coded 0). g Psychology/criminology (eyewitness testimony related subjects) 
coded 1, others coded 0. h Summed average of social, fiscal, and foreign policy political orientations, with Likert 
scales from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7), j "Yes" coded as 1, "No" coded as 0. k Likert scale from 1 (not at 
all patriotic) to 10 (extremely patriotic). l Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree). 
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Experiment 2 Supplemental Results 
Excluding Individuals over Age 60 Analysis 
Table S2.2 
Excluding Participants over Age 60: Experiment 2 Intercorrelations between Memory Distortion 
Measures 
 DRM critical 
lures 
endorsed 
 Suggestion: 
U93 Crasha 
 
 
Imagination: 
U93 Crashb 
 
 
Emotion 
Memory 
Inconsistencyc 
  r p   r p   r p   r p 
Misinfo OFMz  .013 .871   -.216 .008   .129 .156   .087 .287 
Misinfo SCFMz  -.017 .839   -.145 .077   .174 .055   .156 .055 
Suggestion: U93  .074 .369   — —   — —   .023 .784 
Imagination: U93  -.003 .976   — —   — —   -.099 .278 
Emo Mem Inconsis  -.046 .571   — —   — —   — — 
Note. Significant correlation shown in boldface. aUnited 93 crash interview verbal response following 
suggestion to “Have you seen that footage?” (Coded “yes” = 0, “maybe” = .5, “no” = 0). bChange in whether 
they reported seeing the footage from before to after the imagination exercise in the United 93 crash interview 
(coded 1 for a change from “no” before to “yes” afterwards, .5 for a change from “no” to “maybe” or “maybe” 
to “yes”, and 0 for no change). cThe absolute value of the composite change in memory for negative emotions 
after 911, from week 1 to week 2. OFMz = overall false memory (z-adjusted around misinformation group 
mean). SCFMz = Source-Confirmed false memory (z-adjusted). N = 151 apart from those involving the 
imagination task where N = 122. 
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Table S2.3 
Excluding Participants over Age 60: Associations of Individual Differences with Memory 
Paradigms for Experiment 2 
 
 DRM Lures 
Endorsed 
Misinfo 
SCFMa 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
Demographics      
   Gendere -.006 -.024 .078 -.035 .145† 
   Age .135† .043 -.028 -.034 .080 
   Ethnicityf -.092 -.096 .061 .091 -.045 
   Family SES .116 -.083 .098 .052 -.091 
   Political Orientationh .008 -.024 -.061 .032 .010 
Cognitive Ability      
   SAT Total -.103 -.040 -.018 -.175 .008 
   Rationality measures      
   Critical Thinking .076 -.121 .001 .004 -.112 
   Flexible Thinking .081 .000 .036 -.108 -.033 
Other      
   Handedness -.145† .015 -.005 .194* .067 
   Alcohol Use -.036 -.189* .018 -.062 -.088 
   Number Fluent Lang .058 .013 .079 -.159 .104 
      
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations are in boldface (α = .05). † p < .1, * p < .05, 
** p < .01. N = 163 for each column except the imagination column where N = 133.  a Source-Confirmed False 
Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). b False report of seeing United 93 crash footage in the interview, following initial 
suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 0 = no). c Increase in certainty of seeing United 93 crash footage following the 
imagination exercise in the interview. d Absolute value of the change, from Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt 
negative emotion in the week following September 11, 2001. eFemales coded 1, males 0. f Point by serial correlation: 
Caucasian (coded 1) vs. non-Caucasian (coded 0). g Psychology/criminology (eyewitness testimony related subjects) 
coded 1, others coded 0. h Summed average of social, fiscal, and foreign policy political orientations, with Likert 
scales from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7), j "Yes" coded as 1, "No" coded as 0. k Likert scale from 1 (not at 
all patriotic) to 10 (extremely patriotic). l Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 10 (completely agree). 
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Table S2.4 
Excluding Participants over Age 60: Associations of Personality Measures with Memory 
Paradigms for Experiment 2 
 
 DRM Lures 
Endorsed 
Misinfo 
SCFMa 
Suggestion: 
U93 Crashb 
Imagination 
U93 Crashc 
Memory for 
Emotiond 
      
Absorption (TAS) -.018 .014 .067 .008 .028 
Dissociation (DES-C) .082 -.034 .086 .002 -.098 
Fantasy Prone (CEQ) .018 .038 .007 .115 -.058 
Mindfulness (MAAS) .067 -.004 -.028 -.098 .040 
Empathy (BES) .001 -.021 -.017 .040 -.024 
      
Personality Traits (SSP)      
    Somatic Anxiety -.007 -.003 .024 .041 .074 
    Psychic Anxiety -.081 .032 -.036 -.035 -.080 
    Stress Suscept. -.167* -.047 -.020 -.074 -.104 
    Lack Assertiveness -.102 -.084 -.066 -.067 -.075 
    Impulsiveness .071 .006 -.063 -.073 .060 
    Adventure Seeking .030 -.015 .041 .010 .068 
   Detachment -.094 .039 -.038 -.029 .092 
    Social Desirability .035 .029 .103 -.016 .134 
    Embitterment -.111 .117 -.065 .047 -.026 
    Irritability .013 .026 -.076 -.025 .032 
    Mistrust -.097 .153 -.062 -.020 .013 
    Verbal Aggression .043 .048 .014 .030 -.061 
    Physical Aggression .084 .101 -.013 .0005 -.009 
      
Notes. Pearson r correlations shown. Statistically significant correlations at α = .05 are shown in boldface. † p < .1, * 
p < .05, ** p < .01. N = 150 for each column except the imagination column where N = 122. 
a Source-Confirmed False Memory z-score adjusted (SCFMz). b False report of seeing United 93 crash footage in the 
interview, following initial suggestion (coded 1 = yes, .5 = maybe, 0 = no). c Increase in certainty of seeing United 93 
crash footage following the imagination inflation exercise in the interview. d Absolute value of the change, from 
Session 1 to 2, of memory for felt negative emotion in the week following September 11, 2001. TAS = Tellegen 
Absorption Scale. DES-C = Dissociative Experiences Scale, version C. CEQ = Creative Experiences Questionnaire.  
MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale. BES = Basic Empathy Scale. SSP = Swedish Universities Scale of 
Personality 
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Correlations within Students Only (Tables S2.5), and Separately Within AMT Recruited 
Participants (Tables S2.6) Subsamples in Study 2 
Table S2.5 
Within Students Only: Experiment 2 Intercorrelations between Memory Distortion Measures 
 DRM critical 
lures 
endorsed 
 Suggestion: 
U93 Crasha 
 
 
Imagination: 
U93 Crashb 
 
 
Emotion 
Memory 
Inconsistencyc 
  r p   r p   r p   r p 
Misinfo OFMz  .109 .260   -.101 .295   .067 .537   .160 .096 
Misinfo SCFMz  .039 .688   -.010 .917   .192 .073   .199 .038 
Suggestion: U93  <.001 .996   — —   — —   .177 .066 
Imagination: U93  .028 .793   — —   — —   -.148 .169 
Emo Mem Inconsis  -.050 .604   — —   — —   — — 
Note. Significant correlation shown in boldface. aUnited 93 crash interview verbal response following 
suggestion to “Have you seen that footage?” (Coded “yes” = 0, “maybe” = .5, “no” = 0). bChange in whether 
they reported seeing the footage from before to after the imagination exercise in the United 93 crash interview 
(coded 1 for a change from “no” before to “yes” afterwards, .5 for a change from “no” to “maybe” or “maybe” 
to “yes”, and 0 for no change). cThe absolute value of the composite change in memory for negative emotions 
after 911, from week 1 to week 2. OFMz = overall false memory (z-adjusted around misinformation group 
mean). SCFMz = Source-Confirmed false memory (z-adjusted). N = 109 apart from those involving the 
imagination task where N = 88. 
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Table S2.6 
Within AMT Recruited US Adults Only: Experiment 2 Intercorrelations between Memory 
Distortion Measures 
 DRM critical 
lures 
endorsed 
 Suggestion: 
U93 Crasha 
 
 
Imagination: 
U93 Crashb 
 
 
Emotion 
Memory 
Inconsistencyc 
  r p   r p   r p   r p 
Misinfo OFMz  -.298 .028   -.007 .961   .210 .166   -.081 .560 
Misinfo SCFMz  -.096 .492   -.015 .913   .132 .389   .134 .334 
Suggestion: U93  -.085 .543   — —   — —   .209 .130 
Imagination: U93  .058 .705   — —   — —   .059 .700 
Emo Mem Inconsis  -.052 .710   — —   — —   — — 
Note. Significant correlation shown in boldface. aUnited 93 crash interview verbal response following 
suggestion to “Have you seen that footage?” (Coded “yes” = 0, “maybe” = .5, “no” = 0). bChange in whether 
they reported seeing the footage from before to after the imagination exercise in the United 93 crash interview 
(coded 1 for a change from “no” before to “yes” afterwards, .5 for a change from “no” to “maybe” or “maybe” 
to “yes”, and 0 for no change). cThe absolute value of the composite change in memory for negative emotions 
after 911, from week 1 to week 2. OFMz = overall false memory (z-adjusted around misinformation group 
mean). SCFMz = Source-Confirmed false memory (z-adjusted). N = 54 apart from those involving the 
imagination task where N = 45. 
 
